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A number ofyears ago, in 1990 to be exact, I was completing a book on American political
culture. In retrospeet, the initial reactions I received to its title, and to its first line, reveals a lot
about the political situation today, specifically about the common problems faced. by both the
established democracies ofNorth America and Western Europe, and the aspiring democracies of
East and Central Europe. They also suggest what we, as intellectuals, may be able to do about these
common problems.
Among my European friends and colleagues, The Cynica/ Society: The Cu/ture 0/Po/itics
and the Po/itics 0/ Cu/ture in American Lift. seemed to be predicated. on a bazaar notion: that
America is a cynical society. The opposite, in fact, has long appeared to be obvious in the cu.1tural
relations between Europe and America. Europeans are cynical, while Americans are naive.
Depending on the circumstance and the viewpoint of the observer, this proposition comes in a
number ofjudgmental variations upon the common theme. From Americans are hopelessly naive,
young and foolish, while the Europeans are cynical, world weary and wise, to: Europeans are jaded,
without principles and cynical, while Americans are youthful, with firm bellefs and the force for
democratic hope.
The positive version of these comparisons dates back to the early days of the Massachusetts
Bay Colony, with its leaders' vision ofthe American Puritan commnnity as a "city on the hiIl," an
example for an the world to see a truly Christian way oflife.
The negative version was probably most notable here after the end ofthe First World War,
when the political orientation of the Americans for the first time began to effect European political
and economic life. The naive W:dsonian vision ofa "world made safe for democracy" provided the
opening for the harshly cynical tenns ofthe Versailles treaty, with its tragic consequences.
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In more recent years, the superpower status of the United States has added serious drama to
these comparisons. American true believers with an unswpassed nuclear arsenal faced their Soviet
counterparts, with true belief fading into harsh geopolitical cynicism and the machinations of the
C.lA and the KB.G.. At the highest level ofstate, there could no longer be talk about the naiVete
ofthe Americans, but there apparent1y was still a huge chasm between the gentlemen ofthe power
elite and the general public, which only slowly was narrowed The new film about the fifiies, Quiz
Show, tells the story of the beginning of the narrowing process. The prosecution of the Vietnam
War tumed a large segment ofthe American public into cynics. Watergate and its aftermath turned
cynicism into a truly mass phenomenon.
Yet, the old EuropeanlAmerican comparison following the long established pattern still
seemed to hold. From the cynical European point of view, there was general confusion about
Watergate. That the head of state used the powers available to him to maintain and increase bis
authority seerned to be quite natural, the mark ofa shrewd statestnan, not an impeachable offense. It
may have been the case that Americans lost their faith in their governing elites during the Vietnam
War and Watergate, OOt that such events are a cause ofthis transformation may appear to the cynical
European as further evidence for American naiVete. Thus, my European fiiends still had their
doubts about the title and the substance ofmy study ofAmerican politica1 cuhure.
Some ofmy compatriots also were dubious. My first line reads: "I believe that the single most
pressing challenge facing American democracy today is widespread public cynicism." At the time,
this line provoked numerous complaints, among my academic colleagues, on radio talk shows and
by some reviewers.
Among the critically inclined, it appeared that 1was not facing up to the tremendously serious
problems ofAmerican society: the poverty, the racism, the sexism, the dec1ining fortunes ofthe bulk
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of the population during the Reagan-Bush years. 1 was substituting cu1tural criticism for poJitical
and economic analysis, cuhural complaint for poJitical action.
Among the more satisfied, there was denia1- the assertion that as a cynical New Yorker and
an intenectual New Leftist, 1projected my ownjaded view ofthe world on the American public. (In
the American imagination New York often takes the place of Europe in the aforementioned
comparisons between Europe and America). For the partisans of Reaganism, my analysis of cyni-
cism as an odd form of legitimation, combining disbelief of leaders with acceptance ofthe existing
relations ofpower, wasjust not acceptable.
Thus, both on the left and the right, there were doubts about the major thmst ofmy analysis.
Today, though, three years after the publication ofmy book, things are quite different. Across
the poJitical spectrum, it is impossible to avoid the complaint that ours is a cynical society. The
President has given speeches on the subject. It is the theme of major articles in newspapers and
magazines. On radio and television news programs, cynicism has become the term which is used to
describe all that is wrong with the present state ofour political affairs. As an author, 1feel a sense of
pride and vindication, of course, but 1 also feel temoly uncomfortable. For, 1 know that there is a
great deal of imprecisi.on and misunderstanding in the present fashion ofusing cynicism as a major
theme in political diagnosis. There is more to cynicism than meets the eyes of our politicians and
casual poJitical commentators.
When 1 argued that cynicism was American democracy's major challenge, I did not intend to
propose that a cultural phenomenon apart from our major social problems, or apart from the exer-
eise ofpower, was more important than the social problems and the abuses and injustices ofpower.
Rather, my thesis was that cynicism is a major instrument ofpower and that this instrument makes
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social wrongs immune to democratic intelVention. I took very seriously the implications of the
common sense assertion that all politicians are corrupt. Ifthe political elite and the citizenry truly be-
lieve this to be the case, the Marcusean nightmare ofa one dimensional society will be realized; the
Foucaultian identification ofhoeralism and totalitarianism will prove to be tme. The powers that be
will remain unchallenged. This has the effect ofmaking democracy, as the rule ofthe people, seem
to be besides the point, a mere illusion, no more than a pretty and naiVe ideology. I can think ofno
more serious a ehallenge to American democracy than this appearance. Thus, my eontention that
cynicism is the most pressing challenge to American democracy.
There is now a more general recognition that cynicism is a pressing problem, and that the
problem is not confined to any particular democratic polity. There are cynical politieal figures
wherever one looks. We Americans have Ross Perot, the epitome ofthe cynical politician, wbile the
Poles have had Tyminski, the Italians, Belusconi, the Russians, Zhirinovsky, and the Peruvians, Fuji-
mori. The Japanese have lost all faith in their political parties, wbile the British cannot find an alter-
native to Thatcherism. And, ifI am not mistaken, here in Germany, the turn to Kohl and his allies, is
more because there seems to be no alternative, and because of a politics of fear, than because of a
conviction that he and they have govemed well in the recent past or are likely to do so in the future.
Cynicism seems to be the prevailing international politica1 attitude.
In each country in which cynicism is on the rise, there are loeal explanations for its
appea.rance. Yet, the faet that it is appearing in so many different places suggests that there may be a
eommon cause, or set of causes, and these surely go beyond the sorts of explanations American
politicians and political eommentators utilize. I suggest that the relationsbip between cynica1 cultural
attitudes, on the one hand, and the changes in the configurations of geopolitical confliet and
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ideological contests, on the other, must be c10sely examined. On both sides ofthe old iron curtain,
the relations between power and understanding, between meaning and coercion, have disrupted the
previously prevailing political cuhure. The prevalence ofcynicism as a political orientation is direetly
related to this.
My fust investigations ofcynicism as a mode oflegitimation were conducted not west ofhere,
in the United States, but east of here, in Poland and Central Europe. My years spent traveling
around the old Soviet Bloc presented to me a theoretical challenge. How was it possible that the
CounDunist systems smvived despite the fact that it was diflicult to meet aperson truly connnitted to
the official ideology and its practical realization?
I came up with the notion that a very unusual form oflegitimation process was in place, what I
called a "legitimation through disbelief" I realized that this notion seemed to be an oxymoron, but, I
proposed it, nonetheless, because I could find no other way to explain the rather odd and apparently
stable set of political affairs in the previously existing socialist societies. These were societies in
which one set of the political authorities controlled a remarkable range of societallife, from macro
and micro economic struetmes, to all political and cultural institutions. They accomplished this
without political convictions supporting this state of affairs and despite the fact that there was little
brote coercion ofthe Latin American sort. To be sure, in East Germany, Soviet Russia and Bulgar-
ia, it was not as difficult to find a connnitted corntDJmist as in Hungary or Poland, and repression
was more directly used, but even in those societies the time ofgenuine revolutionary elan was over.
Something other than the brote force of terror and the political conviction of ideology was holding
these societies together, was insuring that the political will ofthe authorities was realized
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After puzzling over this problem for a long time, I rea1ized that one of the most prominent
cuhural characteristics of "really existing socialism," the hackneyed use of oflicial language in all
public life, the language of newspeak, played a central role in the legitimation of authority in these
societies. Because people used the ofliciallanguage to get on with their Jives, even when they did
not believe it, they, in their interactions, confirmed the order stIUctured by the disbelieved newspeak.
This is why speaking the truth in public, as Vaclav Havel prescribed, was understood by the authori-
ties as being a fundamental threat to the established order, and in fact was crucial to the e1fective
challenging of the order, from the unionized factories of the Solidarity movement, to the streets of
Liepzig and Prague during their velvet revolutions. Because a fundamental cynicism in the affirlrs of
everyday life sustained the tota1ized system of cmmmmist contro~ abandoning that cynicism was a
fundamental challenge to the system ofcontrol
It has long been argued, in fact, that cynicism was a significant part ofthe totalitarian system.
Hannah Arendt observed in The Origins 0/ Totalitarianism how total CO!llluilment to a political
movement in which the movement is understood to embody all that is true, leads to complete cyni-
cism about the truth. It is simply what the ruling party declares it to be in anY particu1ar circum-
stance, at any time. When this is taken to be the case, anything and everything becomes possible.
There is no separation between the party's interest from the truth. The party's power enforced
through. terror is the truth. Cynicism is the standard operating procedure.
What I observed in East and Central Europe ofthe seventies and eighties was a transformation
ofthis cynical attitude, in a more benign situation, the cynicism of the masses after Stalinism The
newspeak ofeveryday life replaced ideology and terror as the support for Party rule. People found
that they had to use the ofliciallanguage and at least outwardly folIow an oflicial script to get on
with their mundane everyday pursuits. They publicly accounted for their personal ambitions with
7
notions of"building socialism," "serv:ing the working class movement," and the like. They displayed
the appearance ofloyahy to the system with little or no conviction in a wide variety ofways.
Havel describes this process in bis now classic essay, "The Power ofthe Powerless." He tells
the story of the green grocer who takes part in the legitimation process through disbelief and one
day withdraws bis support. The grocer put in the window of bis shop the sign 'WORKERS OF
THE WORLD, UNITE," "along with the fruits and vegetables." He voted in meaningless e1ections
and carefully did not say what he thinks at political meetings. Havel shows through an experiment of
the imagination that not only is this individual's well being dependent upon these little acts oftribute
to the official order, but that the order itself is dependent upon these acts. When people answered
exam questions in schools and universities following the official prescribed truth, rather than with
what they themselves knew to be true, when in preparing a passport application, a biographical
sketch was presented to the authorities in the terms of the international solidarity of the proletariat,
rather than in terms of a personal desire for adventure, when in seeking a promotion, a case was
made for the contribution ofthe applicant to the building ofsocialism, instead ofadesire for a better
or easier life, it was most often the case that both the representative ofParty-state and the individual
seeking official fiwor knew that the rhetoric ofofficialdom was actua1ly a mask for what was actua1ly
going on. Yet, by going through the masquerade, the official order was sustained.
In some ways, this cynical game of everyday life, a cynical acceptance and resignation to the
facts of power, with the utilization of newspeak, does not seem very exotic. After all, the use of
euphemism. by those in power and those who are subjected to power seems to be a general
characteristic ofa11 state and cOlporate bureaucracies, as the universal appeal of the works ofKafka
underscores. The arrogance and acceptance of bureaucracy is not a cynical game specifically of
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totalitarian societies. What was distinctive about the cynicism of the totalitarian system was its
uniform logic and its unitary enforcement, its systemic application in a large scale complex society.
For my studies ofthe politics and cuhure ofEastern Europe, this difference was essential. It helped
explain the distinctive qualities ofpost-Stalinist totalitarian cuhure and its opposition.
On the other hand, for studies ofthe political cuhure ofthe United States and other Western
democracies, the similarities are most telling. When I tumed my attention to the problems ofpoliti-
cal cuhure in my own countIy, I was struck by the faet that an everyday cynicisnl also seemed to
playa significant role in sustaining the existing relations ofpower, and the cynical arrogance of the
powerful is not unknown in h1>eral polities. This was particularly striking in the political campaigns
of 1988, but it is obvious in the day to day fimctioning ofsuch govemment bureaucracies as those of
social welfare, education, defense and immigration and naturalization, as wen.
In the campaign, George Bush promised no new taxes, when both he and most informed
citizens weIl knew that new tax increases were inevitable. Yet, he made the unfulfillable promise and
a significant portion ofthe eleetorate made its political choice on the basis ofit, acting politically on
the basis ofa firirly clear deception. Commentators, both in the popular and academic media, in turn,
analyzed the e:ffectiveness ofthe deception, rather than criticizing it for what it was. The politician,
the eleetorate and intelleetual observers all aeted cynically, and after the inevitable became a reality,
after the tax increases were enaeted, the cynicism continued with all seriously d.iscussing the political
ramifications of Bush's ''broken promise." The disbelieved slogan of '88 had become a central
political reality ofthe 90's.
In a parallel fashion, cynicism peIVades many large scale social institutions, for example in our
schools. There is a general sense that there is sometbing fundamentally wrong with American
education, numerous reports seem to indicate that we are falling behind other countries in our ability
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to prepare the younger generation for the challenges of the post-industrial political economy and
cuhure. We are in the words of a Department of Education study, "A Nation at Risk." Yet, the
public discussion about the problems of education seem to be less about teaching and leaming and
more about ancillary matters of education: about how education is to be paid for, and about how
group cuhures are to be represented in the cwriculum. And these are expressions ofnot very subtle
codes. For some conservatives, a11 the problems of education will be solved through privatization,
and for some on the cuhura1left, a multicuhural education, a rainbow cwriculum, will solve a11
problems. The discussions about education on the right has been a part of its anti-govemrnent
campaign, and on the politicalleft, about the politics of sub-cuhures. Even the measures of educa-
tional achievement are cynically considered. The politicians, the public, and the commen.tators a11
seem more concemed with test scores than with literacy, mathematical capabilities and knowledge.
There seems always to be a hidden agenda in the politics and practices ofeducation.
There, of course, were and are great differences in how cynicism fimctions in a liberal order,
as opposed to a tyrannical one. Indeed, the cynicism of Stalinist and post-Stalinst regimes are
completely different, and the cynicism of the post-cold war era is decidedly different from the
cynicism before the transformations of 1989. Yet, the centrality ofcynicism in contemponuy public
life is a common element. The cynicism in the United States is less systemic than in the previously
existing socialist system. But as in the old socialist order, it too fimctions to support the powers. By
confusing criticism with cynicism, the capacity for an ahemative politics is diminisbed. WIth the
assumption that a11 politics is COInlpt, politica1 resignation resuhs, not opposition. By cynica1ly
approaching public discussions about the workings and problems of social institutions, social
resignation prevails, not reform directed social action. By exercising the responsibilities ofa govem-
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ment post without taking them seriously, they are not serious in their consequences. The pursuit of
the public good tbrough state and social action, then, becomes a mere facade for the pursuit of
private interest and the pursuit ofideologica1 agendas.
The cynicism in the former Soviet bloc and the former "free world" was supported by the
political configuration of the cold war. The lies people told themselves and told each other were
linked to the power struggles of the period. They made sense with reference to these struggles.
During the cold war, there was an understanding in the United States that some of the most bmtal
dictatorsbips were included within the so called free world. To paraphrase Orwell, slavery bad
become freedom This kind of cynical usage made sense because it was set within the manichean
contest between the United States and the Soviet Union. People became accustomed to officiallies
linked with top secrets, and as they became accustomed to this usage, they also came to expect
domestic lies as welI. This was especially the case in the politics of race. As the civil ri.ghts
movement made substantial progress in overtuming the legal supports ofracism and as overt racism
became socially unacceptable, more elliptical measures were politically enaeted to express a raeist
political stance. From Richard Nixon's campaign for law and order to George Bush's infamous
Willie Horton ad, a cynical set ofcodes bas been used to cOIDIDunicate raeist messages in apparent1y
non-raeist ways. This reached its cynical heights when David Duke, a former leader ofthe Klu Klux
Klan and a former member ofthe American Nazi Party, ran as the Republican candidate for Senator
in the state ofLouisiana, winning a majority ofthe white vote, on a civil ri.ghts for whites platform.
There was a coherence in these cynical practices, as there was in the cynicism in the existing
socialist societies. People used their cynicism strategically and with significant mutual
understanding. Ahhough this made open public debate about pressing social and political problems
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difficuh, ifnot imposSIble, OOen the difficulties were overcome, the results could be speetacular.
Thus, those 000 dared to speak the truth in East and Central Europe played such a key role in the
demise of the Communist system, and the tnrth tellers among American writers, most prominently
Tom Morrison, by poetically revealing the existential and historical dimensions ofAmerican racism,
also have had profound cuhural, ifnot political, impact.
In the recent past, cynicism was part of a OOole which people came to recognize. In the old
Soviet Bloc, the OOole and the recognition was enforced by the repressive apparatus of the Party-
state. In the West, the OOole was less reliably enforced and the recognition less certain but it existed
nonetheless. People went along with the cynicism of the powers OOen it came to geopolitics, in
electoral politics and in some aspects ofthe politics ofeveryday life. The cynicism ofboth the East
and the West supported the fimctioning orders ofactual1y existing capitalism and socialism. It did so
in a classical fashion, recalling the inner logic ofthe cynical impu1se.
The first cynic, Diogenes, was a social critic. He questioned the pieties ofthose in power. He
was cynical about their pretensions and the acceptance of their pretensions by others. Cynicism
became a apologetic force OOen the pieties ofthose 000 criticized the powers, the social critics such
as the Christians in Roman times, were questioned along with, or even worse, instead ofthe power-
ful. It was in a sense a short intellectua1 move with long political and cuhural implications, from
critique to apology.
We obseIVe this sort of transformation in post-war America. At the time of the cold war
consensus, to be cynical about the pieties of commnuism in the East and anti-COIDIDImism in the
West, presented a simple and real critical alternative to the prevailing cold war logic, the humor of
Lenny Bmce and the songs ofTom Lehrer serve as popular examples. But when those pieti.es began
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to be challenged, the cynicism about those 000 challenge was the opposite ofcritical, the humor of
the later Mort Sahl and Jackie Mason comes to mind. It's one thing to mock and doubt the truthful-
ness of the racist, but it is something completely different to have similar mocking doubts about
those 000 oppose racism. Ifcynical doubts about those 000 oppose an injustice are equated with
doubts about those 000 enforce the injustice, or if the enforcers are believed while the critics are
doubted, then the injustice likely will go lIDcha11enged. The high cynicism of geopolitics then
becomes the cynicism ofevetyday life. This seemed to the prevailing cuhural attitude ofthe Reagan-
Bushyears.
The appropriate critical intellectual response to this attitude is to reaffirm principle, to make
discriminations between the lame and the convincing, to fonow Havel's advice to "live in truth," ie.
to speak and aet in public according to perceived truths. This is the clear intellectual response to the
generalized cynicism by the conservative, 000 is concemed about the cynicism which erodes the
social order and the wisdom of custom and habit, and by the social critic, 000 perceives that
cynicism has become an obstac1e to change. For, such cynicism is the opponent of both a princi-
pled order and social change.
Things are different now. The cynical strueture has changed, leading from implicit
understandings supporting domination, to explicit confusions lIDdermining both the powers that be
and their opponents. The cold war is with us no more, and the politics of left and right no longer
help organize political action and opinion. The cynicism is still with us, but it is of a free floating
sort. The two superpowers no longer face each other in sublimated moral combat, and the
coherence in the logics of the politicalleft and the political right now are less compelling than their
incoherence.
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With the collapse ofcommunism and anti-communism, a generalized cynicism detached from
organized political culture is upon uso It is the cynicism ofthe unaffiliated and the confused, not of
either the critic or the apologist. I believe that we hear so much today about the cynicism in Ameri-
can society, and elsewhere, not because cynicism is particularly new or has increased, but because it
has changed. It is still a significant problem, but it is a problem in a new way.
I have thus far considered three kinds of cynicism critical cynicism, the cynicism of the
powerfu.l and the cynicism of resigned I have tried to show how critical cynicism tums into
cynicism ofthe powerfu.l and ofthe resigned, and how resignation supports the powerfu.l in our most
recent political past. We now are experiencing a related type ofcynicism, ofthe confused.
People continue to be cynicaI, believing that beneath political appearances there exists an
under1ying reality, but they have no sense ofwhat the nature ofthat reality might be. It no longer is
stIuctured by the communist and the anticormmmist powers. Only narrow se]f:interests and a
disordered set ofideologies remain. Confusion is ubiquitous. It comes in the most malignant and in
re1atively benign forms, from civil wars ofEurasia and Africa to the election campaigns in Califomia
and Virginia. But the attempts to explain the confusion do not make coherent sense. There are the
attempts ofxenophobia and a broad variety ofneo-nationalisms and ofneocormmJDism, of market
magie and ofthe benevolent state. Cynicism comes to reduce an politics to business (ie., I~ey are
an in it for themselvesU ) or goes, as weIl, in the opposite direction, an business is reduced to politics
(ie., uits an a matter ofwho you knOWU ).
We seem to be observ:ing a cast ofcharacters who are peIforming together on the same stage,
playing different scripts. It is unc1ear how the peIformances relate, and an too clear that per-
formance and not real public action is being observed. This is how the politicalleaders with easy
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answers gain their appeal. And even they are very confusing. The public seems to demand easily
understood answers to complex political problems, and the politicians naturally deliver them the
demanded goods. Yet, once these are delivered, it is all too clear that they are shoddy products,
further indicating that politics is a corrupted enterprise. The situation is assured to produce
profound disappointments, and it is selt:generating.
As Ameri.cans went to the polIs last week, this is the sort ofcynicism that could be observed.
There was a general disgust with govemment, a sense that "it is part of the problem, not the
solution,11 this, two years after a Presidential campaign in which the public chose the political party
that promised govemmental solutions to complex social and economic problems. Ahhougb. the
rapid change of opinion was, to be sure, stimulated by the apparent ineptitude of the Clinton
administration, it was probablyjust as much a resuh ofa confused oscillation ofcynical attitudes.
Normally it would have been expected that the Democrats would do relatively weIl in this
midterm election, foIlowing past experi.ences. The economy is in relatively good shape, and there
were accomplisbments by the administration. Yet, the Democrats were decisively rejected, victims
ofa general antipolitical mood in the electorate. There is a clear sense ofbetrayal among significant
segments ofthe population, especially in the South and in the West. First, Bush betrayed them when
he raised taxes, now Clinton betrayed them when he proved not to be a "new dem.ocrat." They now
perceive him as just an old fashioned and ineffectualliberal, more interested in power and its perks,
isolated from the real concems of ordinary people. Yet, this bittemess has less substance than is
usually acknowledged. Just as Bush's broken promise ofno new taxes is less than it seems, so are
Clinton's failures. They say as much about the state of the electorate and the general state of our
political cuhure as about the nature ofa politicalleader.
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Voters chose Clinton as they pretended to believe him, when he promised simuhaneously to
solve the problems ofthe decaying infrastructure, stimulate the economy, enact health care reform,
reform welfilre and lower taxes on the middle c1ass. He knew that a11 this was not possible, even as
he made bis promises, and the bulk of the public probably realized that they were voting for the
pretense rather than for areal promise. But, when the thing they knew was too good to be tme,
proved not to be, they feh that they were somehow betrayed. Clinton could not do somethin.g for
nothing using the govemmen.t, so they chose the Republicans to do something for nothing against
the govemment.
Americans know that they are in a radically new geopolitical situation and a new economic
situation. Yet, they want their geopolitics to be as simple (though not as dangerous) as they were
during the cold war, and they want their economics to be as comfortable as they were when America
dominated the world economy. Hoping does not make it so. That a significant part ofthe American
public ignores this indicates that we are quite like the citizens of the previously existing socialist
societies who somehow hope to reestablish the securities of their old firiled system. People are
confused and they look for easy answers. They support those who provide them with these
answers, and then resent those whom they have supported because the answers have proven not to
be so easy. They start down the confused cynical path by questioning those who say that political
problems of OUf day are complicated, and they end by being cynical about those who promise easy
solutions to complex problems. Since there is no dominant power that confines this cynical spiral, it
is both more apparent than the cynicism ofOUf recent past and less easily controlled.
It is also less easily addressed. rn illustrate this point by relating to you an exchange I had
recently at a public lecture in New York.
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As I was preparing these remarks, I had the good fortune to attend a lecture by Adam
Michnik at my university, the New School for Social Research. Michnik is an old fiiend and in a
sense a New School colleague oflong standing, since he received an honor81)' degree from us in
1984 and especiaIly since he and I worked together on an international oppositional initiative in the
mid and late eighties. He is in New York, as a visiting professor, commemorating the tenth
anniversity ofthese activities. (Significantly, from the point ofview ofBerlin, we granted him the
honor81)' degree as a way of commemorating the fiftieth anniversity ofthe University in Exile.) At
bis major public lecture during bis stay with us, Michnik delivered a text entitled Dignity andFear:
A Dia/ogue with a Friendfrom Be/grade. Inspired by an essay by Nebojsa Popov, he delivered an
open letter to "bis fiiend" about the problems of nationalistic hatred. He spoke as one critical
intellectual to the other, commending Popov, a severe critic of Serbian excesses, for saying no to
xenophobic horrors. "The intellectual must never fiill to defend bis own nation when it is threatened
by its own people."
I listened to bis talk with deep admiration. Here was one ot the tme intellectuals of OUf times,
commending a colleague for taking astand against a great injustice. Echoes of20la and the Dreyfus
affitir were c1early discermble, the intellectual committed to tmth against the prejudices of the
ignorant. Indeed, it was people like Michnik during the COlDlDuuist period who remio.ded us that
intellectuals can still matter. In Havel's terms, and with Havel, he spoke the tmth and aeted upon it,
and, in the process, he helped create a democratic movement that ultimately helped to defeat the
cynical powers oftotalitarianism
Yet, as Michnik spoke, I was struck by doubt. Somehow it seemed that the time of grand
intellectual gestures against the lies of tyrants may be over. I asked him if he thought that the
intellectual still had a role to play. I asked him ifhe thought that the simple aet ofspeaking the tmth
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in publie, writing articles and delivering open letters were effective ways to oppose the threats of
xenophobie nationalism in the post-eorntmmist world.
He gave the expected answer. It is not, he counselled, a question of effectiveness. When
Thomas Mann wrote his famous lecture to the Rector, he did not eonsider whether his protest
would have an impact. He simply acted with honor and honesty. He spoke the truth, the primary
responsibility ofthe intellectual. At the same time Mann eomposed his letter, most Germans adapted
themselves to the rising power ofNazism, with varying degrees of enthusiasm. Yet, while Mann
could not possibly be effective in that politieal elimate, it is important, nonetheless, that he told the
truth in his letter.
This was elassie Miehnik,a elassieal response of an intellectua1 moralist. As an individual
citizen, I eould not be anything but in eomplete agreement. But as a sociologist ofcynicism, I, as an
observer ofthe social drama and not on1y as an actor, have reservations. It is not that I think that
prominent intellectuals should act differently now, that their dedieation to the truth should be
qualified. It is, rather, that I believe that we must eome to understand that in the present cynical
environment it has beeome quite easy to make apolitical stanee, agrand gesture, and far more
difficuh to be intelligible about pressing, but not neeessarily higbly dramatie, social and political
problems. And beeause eonfusion, and its cynicism are eentral problems, the aetions ofintellectuals
probably need to take on new fonns, or at least a different strategie dimension.
When I wrote The Cynical Society, in the mid and late eighties, it seemed to me that the
eentral problem ofcynicism was related to my professional oecupation, as a malady. Ameri.cans had
leamed their sociology too wen. A sociological reduetionism had come to dominate our polities and
cuhure. There was no appreciation of the vocations of polities and cuhure as significant ends in
themselves, everything was being redueed to the social structures ofeconomie interests. The project
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ofthe intellectual in response to this sort of situation, should be, in my judgment, to act on principle.
Telling the truth ofprinciple may not always have the consequences it had in Eastem Europe and
the price paid for the telling may not be as great, but it is no less important. Such tmth telling makes
it possible for the existing institutions of democratic practice to be remembered, and with such
remembrance people can act in ways that help to reconstitute them. The major response of intel-
1ectua1s to cynicism, I thus believed, should be truth telling, as Michnik proposed.
I still think that this is important, but believe that the changes in our geopolitical and
ideological force us to consider an additional dimension - time. I have a sense that our political
cuhure is moving too rapidly, just when we should be slowing down. There is a need to address our
confusions, to make sense ofour changed world, and this takes time.
There is no need to moum. the demise ofthe cold war and the super power conßict. The col-
lapse ofthe ideologicalleft and right is an opportunity for political creativity, not necessarily the end
to meaningful politics. Yet, because the geopolitical moorings ofpolitics ofthe last fifty years have
been annihilated and the ideological guidelines of politics of the last two hundred years have been
dismpted, we, as citizens, need to take time to reconsider our positions. Intellectuals need to slow
things down so this will be possible. Not only telling the truth, but looking for the truth is essential
in a time ofconfusion. Getting people to slow down and ask questions becomes just as important as
providing answers. Indeed it is the easy answer, the quick fix, which is a fimdamen.tal COlilmitlOent
of the confused cynic, from Perot to Zhirinovsky, and their followers, from the ultra nationalists of
the former Yugoslavia to the neo-comnnmist ofthe former Soviet Union.
Taking time to think, of course is no simple matter. Just like, it is no easy matter to ten the
tmth. When Michnik declares that the responsibility ofthe intelleetual is to speak the truth and when
Havel declared that living in truth was the most profound cha11enge to the comnnmist tyranny,
19
serious political and philosophical problems conceming "truth telling" were being avoided in order to
underscore an important practical point. When people avoid the regime ofthe lie, they fundamental-
1y undermine it. When 1 suggest that taking time to tbink is an important antidote for today's
cynicism, 1also am not facing up to serious complications, sociological and technological ones. For,
we live in times in which the old adage, "time is money," is increasingly salient. In the post-industrial
economy time is increasingly the basis of power and weahh. The one who can move or process
information more rapidly than the other prevails. Further, beyond such a material argument against
deliberateness, there are dominant cultural forms, from television to popular music, which accustom
people to speed up, not slow down. And even further, the consumer culture ofadvanced capitalism
valorizes instant gratification, not enduring pleasures. In such a situation, deliberate tbinking is a
difficuh achievement.
Yet, it would be a mistake to overdramatize the problem. There are institutions which help us
to take time out and support delIberation: universities, foundations, research institutes, etc., and
there are institutions that help link the work of the professional intellectuals to a broader public:
journals, public television and radio, librarles and some religious institutions. There is a field that
presents an opportunity for practical action.
1 obviously cannot analyze the problems and prospects for criti.cal intellectual action in this
fie1d in this presentation. This will be a part ofa long term project on which 1 am presently working
on the role ofintellectua1s in democratic societies. It suffices to point out here that the institutional
supports for deliberative action are problematic. To some degree the prevailing economic and
politica1 pressures on the universities and other institutions potentiany supporting deliberation move
in the directi.on ofinstrumental activity, to prepare the young for the job market, to do the research
that has immediate practical applications. This is evident in the nature of the financial support of
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these institutions and the developing professional ethos within them. Yet, we still ean observe that
there are plaees for people to slow things down, and pose a question, directing themselves to the
task ofprovoking the general publie to question both the quite evident abuses of authority and the
easy cynieal interpretations and remedies ofsueh abuses.
Before elosing, I would like to say a few final words about today's cynicism. Up to tbis point,
I have focused on the under1ying formal aspects of cynieal cuhure and its relationship to the
eonfigurations ofpower and ideology during the cold war and after. I would like to eonelude with
some re.t1ections on an oddity of the politieal eontent of cynicism, its reactionary tendency.
Throughout the old Soviet bloe, eommunists are retuming to power, and in the West a laissez firlre
polities ofa firirly extreme sort is ascendent. These two tendencies lead to the oddest resuhs here in
Germany, with a nostalgie polities apparently pulling led in the East and right in the West. Yet, I do
not think that these odd opposing tendencies really have mueh to do with the led and the right.
Rather, they are, in my judgment, desperate attempts to avoid eonfusion in eonfusing times. Even if
the old order is not remembered with unambiguous fondness, people Wlderstood the mles of
everyday life and they yeam for tbis lost understanding. They become eonvinced that there is only
eormption and lies outside oftbis understanding, and they are easily manipulated. Thus, the answer
to cynicism and its eonsequenees is the critieal approach ofthe intellectual His or her effectiveness
is an important issue and not at all eertain. Given all the problems intellectuals have in democratie
societies and the problems democracyhas with inte11ectuals' pessimism would be in order if it were
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